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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTI- N
Vpf.^'J I mi

St..uil'.'

'

.in

' ;"•-.; ''

... -;gs this appeal

from the decision of the Second Judic.il District Ccur* of D-v- - County, State of Utah, entered on A"-

jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp.
1991).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE
STANDARDS OF REVIEW,
1.

Does the discretionary function provision of the

Utah governmental immunity act, §63-30-10(1)(a), limit the waiver
of immunity of governmental entities under §63-30-8 for injuries
caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any
highway, road or street?
using a de novo standard.

The Supreme Court reviews this question
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497 (Utah

1989) .
2.

Does the negligent inspection provision of the

Utah Governmental Immunity Act, §63-30-10(1)(d), limit the waiver
of immunity of governmental entities under §63-30-8 for injuries
caused by a defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of any
highway, road or street?
using a de novo standard.

The Supreme Court reviews this question
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P. 2d 497 (Utah

1989) .
3.

Does

a

municipal

corporation

have

a

duty

to

motorists to remove sight obstructions from its streets, roads,
and highways when those sight obstructions are located on private
property?

The Supreme Court reviews this question using a de

novo standard.
4.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
Does a municipal corporation have a duty to warn

individuals using its streets, roads and highways of dangerous or
hazardous conditions the motorist may encounter on the roads?
2

The Supreme Court reviews this question using a de novo standard.
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
5.

Does

a

municipal

corporation

have

a

duty

to

install traffic control devices at an intersection in order to
eliminate dangerous or hazardous conditions in the intersections
of its roads, streets or highways?

The Supreme Court reviews

this question using a de novo standard.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788

P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
6.

Is a duty on the part of a municipal corporation

created or enhanced by its long-standing actual knowledge of a
dangerous or unsafe condition of its roads, highways, or streets?
The Supreme Court reviews this question using a de novo standard.
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
7.

Does Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19 establish a duty for

a municipal corporation to have sight obstructions on private
property removed?
a de novo standard.
8.
only?

The Supreme court reviews this question using
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).

Is Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19 mandatory or directory

The Supreme court reviews this question using a de novo

standard.

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
9.

Given the outstanding discovery at the time and

Rule 56(f) considerations, did the trial court err in denying the
plaintiff's written Motion to Continue a decision on Bountiful's
Motion for Summary Judgment?
question

using

The Supreme Court reviews this

an abuse of discretion

3

standard.

Strand v.

Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191 (Utah
1977) •
10.

Assuming

a

duty

on

the

part

of

a

municipal

corporation to remove sight obstructions on private property,
install

traffic

control

devices

at

intersections

or

warn

motorists of dangerous street conditions, is there a genuine
issue of fact about whether the defendant has fulfilled its duty
in light of the information presented to the trial court?

The

Supreme Court reviews this question using a de novo standard.
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The following statutes are controlling in this action:
Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19.
(1)
The owner of real property
shall remove from his property any
tree, plant, shrub, or other
obstruction, or part of it, which,
by obstructing the view of any
operator, constitutes a traffic
hazard.
(2)
When the Department of
Transportation
or any
local
authority determines upon the basis
of an engineering and traffic
investigation that a traffic hazard
exists, it shall notify the owner
and order that the hazard be
removed within ten days.
Utah Code Ann.. §63-30-10(1)(a) and (d).
(1)
Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a
negligent action or omission of an
employee committed with the scope
of employment except if the injury:
4

(a)
Arises out of the
exercise or performance
of
the
failure
to
exercise or perform a
discretionary function,
whether
or not the
discretion is abused.
(d)
Arises out of a
failure
to make an
inspection, or by reason
of making an inadequate
or negligent inspection
of any property.
Utah Code Ann., §63-30-8.
Immunity
from
suit
of all
governmental entities is waived for
any injury caused by a defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley,
crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other
structure located thereon.
S T A T E M E N T
A.

OF

THE

CASE

Nature of the case
Jones was severely brain-damaged as a result of an

accident which occurred at an intersection improperly maintained
by Bountiful City Corporation ("Bountiful").

Jones filed this

action against Bountiful alleging a failure to properly mark the
intersection, failure to remove or order the removal of foliage
obscuring

the

vision

of

motor

vehicle

operators

using

the

intersection and a failure to maintain safe highways, roads, and
streets.
Summary Judgment was ordered prior to the completion of
the discovery cut off on the grounds of governmental immunity
under §63-30-10 (1) (a) and on the grounds that Bountiful had no

duty to remove obstructing foliage from private property.

Jones

argued that the governmental immunity was waived under §63-3 0-8
and that under that statute, Utah Code Ann., §41-6-19 and common
law Bountiful had a duty to remove obstructing foliage.

B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
The Complaint

1988.

in this action was filed in August of

In January of 1991 the court set dispositive dates for

hearing motions and completion of discovery.
off was April 22, 1991.

The discovery cut

Bountiful moved for summary judgment as

to all claims against it on January 30, 1991 and the matter was
heard at oral argument on February 26, 1991.

The court issued a

minute entry ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment on March
21, 1991 and it was reduced to a signed Order on April 29, 1991.
On March
reduced

29, 1991, prior to the time the Court's ruling was
to

a

signed

Reconsideration.

Order,

Jones

filed

his

Motion

for

The Court entered its ruling on the Motion for

Reconsideration on April 25, 1991 and it was reduced to an Order
on May 20, 1991.

Jones filed his Notice of Appeal on May 17,

1991.

C.

Statement of Facts

1.

On

eastbound

September

13,

1987,

on Beverly Way

intersection

he

drove

in Bountiful.

collided

southbound on 12 00 East.

Jones

with

his

vehicle

As Jones entered

another

vehicle

Complaint, p. 1, R. 1.
6

motor

the

traveling

2.

The collision left Jones severely brain-damaged•

Jones is

unable to engage in his regular daily affairs and has suffered a
loss of enjoyment of life.
3.

Complaint, p. 2, R. 2.

The intersection of Beverly Way and 1200 East is an open

intersection, that is, one that has no traffic control device for
individuals using the intersection.

Defendant Bountiful City's

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for
Summary Judgment, p. 2., R. 90.
4.

Rosebushes

growing

on

the

northwest

corner

of

the

intersection of Beverly Way and 1200 East obstructed the vision
of southbound and eastbound traffic at the intersection at the
time of the accident.

Exhibit "A" - deposition of Ms. Dorothy

Carol Bloss, pp., 5-15, 30; Exhibit "B11 - deposition of Cindy B.
Paxman, pp. 36,37; Exhibit "C" - deposition of Kevin O'Connell,
pp. 6-15.
5.

The obstructing foliage is located on private property owned

by Rowena Beavers.

Defendant Bountiful City's Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
pp.

2-3,

R.

90-91;

Plaintiff's

Memorandum

of

Points

and

Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2,
R. 112.
6.

On September 6, 1985, Dorothy Carol Bloss was in an accident

at the

intersection

of Beverly Way and

southbound and eastbound cars.

12 00 East

involving

Immediately after the accident

Ms. Bloss contacted Layne Forbes, Bountiful City Prosecutor, and
Jack Balling, Bountiful City Engineer, to complain about the
7

rosebushes on Rowena Beaver's property blocking her vision and
causing the accident.
7.

Exhibit "A", pp. 5-15, 30.

A couple of months prior to Jones' accident, Ms. Dixie

Jacobs, who

resides

one house south of the intersection of

Beverly Way and 1200 East contacted a Bountiful City Official to
complain about the dangerousness of the

intersection.

The

Bountiful City official told Ms. Jacobs that a committee was
reviewing

the

intersection

of

Beverly

Way

and

12 00

East.

Affidavit of Dixie Jacobs, pp. 1,2, R. 276, 277.
8.

On August 14, 1987, Kevin O'Connell was traveling eastbound

on Beverly Way when he struck a vehicle traveling southbound on
1200 East.

Kevin O'Connell complained to Officer Carl Krall,

Sergeant Winters, and the Bountiful City Prosecutor that his
vision was obstructed by rosebushes located on Rowena Beavers'
"property.
9.

Exhibit "C", pp. 6-15.

At the time Bountiful's Motion for Summary Judgment came on

for hearing on February 26, 1991, Jones was awaiting response
from

Bountiful

of

outstanding

Requests

for

Production

of

Documents that were sent to Bountiful on January 31, 1991.

R.

35, 36.
10.

At the time of hearing on Bountiful's Motion, Jones had also

scheduled the depositions of Bountiful City officials regarding
notice

they

property.
11.

had

of

the

sight

obstruction

on

Ms. Beavers'

R. 101-104.

Four days before the hearing on Bountiful!s Motion for

Summary Judgment, Jones, through his attorney, filed under Rule
8

56(f), U.R.C.P., a Motion to Continue a decision on Bountiful!s
Motion

for

completed.
12.

Summary

Judgment

until

additional

discovery

was

Exhibit "D" - Motion to contnue, pp. 1,2, R. 134-13 6.

At the hearing on Bountiful!s Motion for Summary Judgment on

February 26, 1991, Jones1 counsel reiterated the need to continue
consideration of Bountiful1s Motion and explained in detail why a
complete factual basis was not available to the plaintiff without
being allowed to carry on additional discovery.

Transcript of

Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 13-16.
13.

At the hearing, the trial court informed counsel for both

parties that oral argument would go forth that day but that
counsel would be permitted

to submit supplemental briefs as

discovery progressed before a decision was rendered.

Transcript

of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 16, lines 15-19.
14.

After oral argument on February 26, 1991 but before issuance

of the March 21, 1991 ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment
by the Court, Jones1 counsel reiterated his understanding that
additional briefing would be allowed and proposed a time frame
for

submitting

those

supplemental

memoranda.

Plaintiff's

Memorandum in support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1, R.
158, Exhibit

!f lf

E

- letter from Brian S. King to Judge Cornaby

dated March 19, 1991.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Bountiful had a mandatory statutory duty under §63-3 0-8
and §41-6-19, Utah Code. Ann. , and a common law duty to provide
safe

streets

free

of

obstructing
9

foliage.

Additionally,

Bountiful

had

a duty

intersection until

to warn

of the dangerous nature of the

it was made safe either by removal of the

obstruction, posting of a traffic control device, or otherwise.
The extent of Bountifulfs duty was dependent on their knowledge
of the hazardous intersection.

As such, whether Bountiful had a

duty to provide safe streets in this case and whether that duty
was

breached

material fact.

are

breached

that

duty

is

a

genuine

issues

of

Summary Judgment was improperly awarded because

of these genuine issues and the fact that Jones 1 discovery was
not completed.
I.

BOUNTIFUL IS NOT IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY ITS
FAILURE TO KEEP FOLIAGE FROM OBSTRUCTING THE VIEW OF MOTOR
VEHICLE OPERATORS.
Bountiful is liable for Jones 1 injuries under the Utah

Governmental Immunity Act because it failed to remove a dangerous
condition from its streets.

The version of Utah Code Ann. , §63-

3 0-8 in effect at the date of the accident stated:
Immunity
from
suit
of
all
governmental entities is waived for
any injury caused by a defective,
unsafe, or dangerous condition of
any highway, road, street, alley,
crosswalk,
sidewalk,
culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other
structure located thereon.
However, Bountiful claims that the actions of which the
plaintiff complains fall under the discretionary function and/or
negligent

inspection clauses of the Governmental Immunity Act,

U.C.A. §63-3-10(1) (a) and §63-30-10(1) (d) :

10

(1)
Immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a
negligent action or omission of an
employee committed within the scope
of employment except if the injury:
(a) Arises out of the
exercise or performance
or
the
failure
to
exercise or perform a
discretionary function,
whether
or not the
discretion is abused;
(d) arises out of a
failure
to make an
inspection, or by reason
of making an inadequate
or negligent inspection
of any property.
A.

The relationship between U.C.A. 563-30-8 and §63-3010(1)(a).
The first time this Court addressed the interaction

between §63-30-8 and §63-30-10(1)(a) was in Sanford v. University
of Utah, 26 Utah 2d. 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).

The Sanford court

found that the manner in which the Governmental Immunity Act was
drafted indicated that the legislature did not intend Section 10
with its exceptions to modify other aspects of the Act, including
Section 8.

The Court found this was true because " . . .

the

waiver of immunity in Sections 8 and 9 encompasses a much broader
field

of

tort

liability

than

merely

negligent

conduct

employees within the scope of their employment . . . "

of

488 P. 2d

at 745.
This Court touched on the relationship between §63-3010(1)(a) and §63-30-8 again in Biqelow v. Ingersoll. 618 P.2d 50
11

(Utah 1980) .

As

in the present case, Biaelow v. Inaersoll

involved a claim against a municipality for failure to provide
adequate traffic

control devices at an

defense of discretionary function.

intersection

and the

Biaelow holds that the acts

of a governmental entity in designing a traffic control system do
not

involve

a

discretionary

function

under

63-30-10(1)(a)•

Biaelow also suggests that §63-30-8 imposes liability for injury
from any unsafe or dangerous condition of highways regardless of
the degree of discretion involved.
Again, in Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah
1982), this Court reversed

a trial court's Summary Judgment

granted under very similar factual circumstances.

In Bowen, a

personal injury plaintiff brought a claim against Riverton City
for failure to maintain a stop sign that had fallen down at an
intersection.
motion.

The Court granted the city's summary judgment

On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court and held

that the city's duty to maintain safe streets was non-delegable
and the question of whether that duty had been fulfilled was one
of fact to be determined by a jury.

Id. at 437.

As in Bowen,

Summary Judgment in the present case was improperly awarded.
Once it is determined that the discretionary function clause does
not modify or limit §63-30-8, it is clear that whether Bountiful
discharged its duty to maintain the safe condition of its streets
is not something that can be resolved on Summary Judgment.
This

Court

addressed

the

§63-30-8

discretionary

function relationship again in a recent case with remarkable
12

factual
1985).

similarity,

Richards

v.

Leavitt,

716

P. 2d

276

(Utah

Richards involved a plaintiff who alleged that a city was

negligent in allowing trees, shrubs, and other growth to obscure
a stop sign at an intersection•
This Court stated:
Recent Utah case law involving
similar facts to those before us
supports our holding here that the
maintenance and repair of traffic
signs is a governmental function
from which immunity from suit has
been expressly waived and which is
not within
the
discretionary
function
exception,
[emphasis
added]
Id., at 279.
Richards also stated that such a ruling was consistent
with

the majority

traditional

of

jurisdictions which have abolished

proprietary-governmental

analysis,

irrespective

"the
of

whether their analyses are based on specific statutory provisions
or the broader exceptions to discretionary

function exceptions

like those found in §63-30-10 of the Utah Act."

Richards is a

clear statement that the theory upon which Bountiful bases its
position is untenable.
The plaintiff's argument is reinforced by the 1991 Utah
legislature's amendment to §63-30-8.
30-10

to

limit the waiver

of

The amendment allows §63-

immunity

found

in

§63-30-8

and

highlights the fact that, prior to 1991, §63-30-8 was not limited
in any way by the discretionary function clause.
§63-3 0-8

in

1987 to waive governmental

should be enforced.
13

immunity

The intent of
is clear and

B.

The relationship between U.C.A.
10(1)(d).
While

the

Bowen

court

held

563-30-8 and

that

the

563-30-

question

of

municipal liability for failure to inspect a stop sign should be
submitted

to

relationship
there

a

jury,

between

no

Utah

§63-30-8

and

cases

directly

address

§63-30-10(1)(d).

is no reason that the case law and principles

the

However,
outlined

above relating to the discretionary function clause should not
apply with equal force to the negligent inspection clause.
II.

BOUNTIFUL HAS BOTH A STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW DUTY TO
FACILITATE THE REMOVAL OF FOLIAGE FROM PRIVATE LAND WHICH
OBSTRUCTS THE VIEW OF MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS.
A.

541-6-19 imposed a duty on Bountiful to remove or
compel Rowena Beavers to remove obstructing foliage.
Section 41-6-19(2) of the Utah Code imposes a duty upon

Bountiful to ensure the removal of foliage on private property
that obstructs the view of motor vehicle operators.
§41-6-19 in full states:
(1)
The owner of real property
shall remove from his property any
tree, plant, shrub, or
other
obstruction, or part of it, which,
by obstructing the view of any
operator, constitutes a traffic
hazard.
(2)
When the Department
of
Transportation
or
any
local
authority determines upon the basis
of an engineering
and traffic
investigation that a traffic hazard
exists, it shall notify the owner
and order that the hazard be
removed within ten days.
Utah Code. Ann., §41-6-19.

14

Bountiful

had

actual

notice

of the traffic hazard

created by the foliage on Beaver's property based on at least
three separate complaints provided by city residents dating back
to at least two years and, at latest, one month before the
plaintiff's accident.

See Statement of Facts, paragraphs 6-8.

These repeated, direct attempts to bring the dangerous condition
of the intersection to the attention of a number of separate
Bountiful City officials constitute the type of notice required
by the statute.
Based

on

its

knowledge

of

the

foliage

problem,

Bountiful had a duty to notify Beavers as required by §41-6-19(2)
and order her to remove the obstructing

foliage.

Bountiful

breached

its duty by not taking any action to provide such

notice.

Jones alleges this failure on Bountifulfs part was a

proximate cause of his injuries.

The extent to which there was a

duty based on notice to the city, breach and a cause of harm to
Jones are questions for the jury.
B.

Bountifulfs duty under §41-6-19
than discretionary.

is mandatory rather

Under the language of §41-6-19, Bountiful's duty to
ensure the removal of the foliage was mandatory rather than
discretionary.

This court stated

in Board

of Education of

Granite School District v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah
1983):
Generally those directions that are
not of the essence of the thing to
be done, but which are given with a
view merely to the proper,
ordinary, and prompt conduct of
15

business and by failure to obey no
prejudice will occur to those whose
rights are protected by the
statute,
are
not
commonly
considered mandatory . . . The
provision will not be considered
mandatory if the purpose of the
statute has been substantially
complied with and no substantial
rights have been jeopardized.
Board of Education at 1033 quoting
Kennecott Copper V. Salt Lake City,
575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978).
The Board

of Education

case held

that because the

plaintiff had been prejudiced and the language of the statute
included the word "shall" the statute would be interpreted as
imposing a mandatory duty on the state.

The same is true in the

present case.
In the cases of Helsten v. Schwendiman, 668 P. 2d 509
(Utah 1983), and Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204 (Utah App.
1988), the courts reviewed provisions of Utah Code Ann., §41-644.10, dealing with the procedures to be followed in revoking the
drivers licenses of persons charged with D.U.I.

These code

provisions are from the same chapter of the Motor Vehicle Code as
§41-6-19.

The issue in both cases is the interpretation of

provisions requiring the making of a sworn statement by a police
officer and the timing of submitting the statement.
held that the provisions of §41-6-44.10 are mandatory.
court stated:
A statute is regarded as directory
when no substantial rights depend
on it, no injury can result from
ignoring it, and the purpose of the

16

The courts
The Moore

legislation can be accomplished in
a manner other than that prescribed
with
substantially
the same
results,
Moore at 206, quoting Wilcox v. Billings, 438 P. 2d 108 (Kansas
1968).
Bountiful!s duty under
Jones1

substantial

§41-6-19

rights have been

is mandatory,

interfered

Mr.

with because

Bountiful ignored its duty to give notice to Rowena Beavers to
remove

obstructing

foliage

from

private

land.

When

read

together, §41-6-19 and 63-30-8 make it clear that the legislature
intended to establish a duty for municipalities to maintain safe
roads by removing obstructing foliage wherever it occurs.
Even if it is read as being directory only, Board of
Education

indicates

there

is

still

a

legal

duty

and

that

Bountiful must be in "substantial compliance" with the statute to
discharge that duty.

Board of Education at 1033.

There is no

indication of any type that Bountiful ever made any attempt to
give any type of notice whatsoever to Rowena Beavers.
statutory

duty

remains

unfulfilled

under

Bountifulfs

The
own

argument.
C.

Bountiful has a common law duty to warn of and/or remove
foliage which obstructs the view of motor vehicle operators.
In addition to a statutory responsibility, Bountiful

has a common law duty to remove dangerous obstructions in order
to make its streets safe.
McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, §54.69.a, p. 234
states:
17

. whether or not obstructions to view
growing at or near an intersection constitute
a danger or hazard to a prudent motorist
presents a genuine issue of material fact
regarding a municipalities1 negligence. And
where
a city
knowingly
maintains
an
intersection right-of-way in a manner which
dangerously
obstructs
the visions
of
motorists using the streets, a city is liable
for its failure to warn of the danger and, if
necessary, make safe the defective condition.
[emphasis added]
This duty to warn of hazardous conditions on the public
roads is re-emphasized in other sections of McQuillan:
. . . a municipality which controls
a roadway has a duty to warn
motorists of hazards adjacent to
the roadway even if the hazard
itself is not within the control of
the municipality . . . the duty of
the municipality to take proper
precautions by guards or barriers,
and lights at night, or some other
reasonable manner of the danger
some other reasonable manner of the
danger
occasioned
by
the
obstructions is uniformly enforce
and failure in this respect is
negligence.
Id., §54.90a, p. 335.

McQuillan also states:

A municipality
is required to
exercise ordinary care to guard or
warn
travelers
against
such
injuries as might be reasonably
anticipated from dangers in its
streets which may result from
excavations or obstructions created
by others . . . . [emphasis added]
Id., at §54.91, pg. 339.
McQuillan also states that the notice question becomes
important when a defect in the street is caused by the act of the
18

third person.

In those circumstances, the municipality is not

liable unless it:
. . . (a) has actual notice of the
defect, or (b) of such facts and
circumstances
as with by
the
exercise of reasonable diligence
lead a prudent person to such
knowledge.
Id., §54-102, p. 373.
In seeking a recovery against a
city
for injuries due to
an
allegedly defective public way, it
is only where the negligence relied
on is the failure of the city to
remove an obstruction or to repair
a defect in the street, not caused
by its own act or neglect, that the
question of notice of obstruction
or defect is an essential element.
Id., §54-104, p. 378.
Bountiful1s

common law duty to facilitate removal of

Ms. Beaver's foliage or at the very least warn motorists of the
dangers

presented

representatives
foliage created.

by

were

the

rosebushes was

notified

of

the

established

dangerous

when

its

condition

the

Both the degree of notice provided and whether

Bountiful breached its duty to remove the foliage are material
issues of fact that should be reviewed by a jury.

The Summary

Judgment should be set aside in light of Bountifulfs mandatory
statutory

and common

law duties.

This Court has stated, "If

there is any issue as to any material fact, the motion should be
denied."

Ruffineao v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 1978).
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO CONTINUE AND IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT BEFORE DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETED
In the present case, the lower court improperly ordered
summary judgment before the completion of discovery.

As stated

in Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P. 2d 275 (Utah App.),
cert den., 765 P.2d
withheld

if

1277

discovery

(1987), "Summary judgment should be
is

incomplete

because

additional

information may come to light that creates genuine issues of
material fact."
A number of cases have been cited in Utah in recent
years regarding the factors a court should take account when
faced with a Rule

56(f) Motion to Continue.

In Strand v.

Associated Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 194
(1977) this Court stated that:
Unless dilatory or lacking in
merit, the [Rule 56(f)] motion
should be liberally treated.
Exercising a sound discretion the
trial court then determines whether
the stated reasons are adequate.
Strand also indicates that the affidavit required by Rule 56(f)
need not be evidentiary in form butis was to provide the court
with specific reasons showing why continuance of consideration of
a Motion for Summary Judgment is necessary.
This
premature

Court

granting

was
of

again
a

faced

Motion

for

Id.

with

the

Summary

Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376 (1977).

issue

of

Judgment

a
in

In Auerbach's,

the party opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment was waiting
for responses to outstanding discovery at the time the opposition
20

to the motion was due.

Based primarily on that fact, this Court

reversed the trial courtfs granting of the Motion for Summary
Judgment stating:
The granting of the Motion for
Summary Judgment was premature
because Kimball's discovery was not
then complete.
It was the
information
sought
in
the
proceedings for discovery, which
Kimball claimed would infuse the
issues with facts sufficient to
defeat a Motion for Summary
Judgment . . . .
576 P.2d at 377.
This Court in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984)
likewise determined that when facts sought through discovery are
in the possession of the moving party and the non-moving party
has

initiated

discovery

to gather those facts but time for

discovery has not been completed or the moving party has not
responded to the outstanding discovery, ordinarily the trial
court should grant a Rule 56(f) motion.

Id. at 313-315.

Cases from the Court of Appeals since Cox have outlined
additional considerations a trial court should take into account
consider under Rule 56(f).

The Court of Appeals in Callioux v.

Progressive Insurance Company, 745 P.2d 838 (Utah App. 1987),
quoting Moores Federal Practice, stated:
The mere averment of exclusive
knowledge or control of the facts
by the moving party is not
adequate. The opposing party must
show to the best of his ability
what
facts are within
the
movementfs exclusive knowledge or
control, what steps have been taken
to obtain the desired information

pursuant to discovery procedures
under the rule, and that he is
desirous of taking advantage of
these discovery procedures.
745 P.2d at 840-41.
In addition, the Callioux court, relying on Cox v.
Winters, delineated several factors to consider under Rule 56(f):
Were the reasons articulated in the
Rule 56(f) affidavit "adequate" or
is the party against whom summary
judgment is sought merely on a
"fishing expedition" for purely
speculative
facts
after
a
substantial discovery has been
conducted without producing any
significant evidence? (2) Was there
sufficient time since the inception
of the lawsuit for the party
against whom the summary judgment
is sought to use
discovery
procedures, and thereby crossexamine the moving party? (3) If
discovery procedures were timely
initiated, was the non-moving party
afforded an appropriate response?
Id.
Applying the law stated above to the facts of this
case, it is evident that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Jones' Motion to Continue.

In that Motion, to Continue

and in greater detail at hearing on the Motion to Continue,
counsel for the plaintiff outlined with specificity the need to
delay ruling until the discovery cut off had expired or, at the
very least, until the outstanding discovery at the time of the
hearing was completed.

Plaintiff's counsel outlined the need to

determine the degree to which Bountiful had notice of the foliage
problem

and

failed to act on that knowledge.
22

In addition,

discovery was conducted as to the procedures that Bountiful had
in place to insure compliance with notices given by the city to
residents.

Plaintiff's counsel informed the court that lack of

information precluded the plaintiff's presentation by affidavit
of facts essential to justify opposition to Bountiful's Motion.
In addition, the fact that there was outstanding discovery in the
form

of

Requests

depositions

was

for

Production

presented

to

of

the

Documents

trial

and

court.

pending

The

best

indication that these reasons were "adequate" and that Jones was
not on a "fishing expedition" for purely speculative facts is
that the discovery conducted between February 26, 1991 and the
date the court ruled on the Motion for Reconsideration uncovered
many crucial pieces of information from a wide variety of sources
concerning

Bountiful

City's

enforcement

procedures

for

code

violations, knowledge that it had of sight obstruction at the
intersection, and the identity of individuals who had complained
on numerous occasions to Bountiful City prior to the accident
involving

Jones.

All

of

the

information

referred

to

in

paragraphs 6-8 of the Statement of Facts, supra, was discovered
after

the

date

of

the

hearing

on

Bountifulfs

Motion.

Nevertheless, the trial court denied Jones' Motion to Continue
and granted the Motion for Summary Judgment.
As a result of the denial of the Motion to Continue and
granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Jones was forced to
resort to the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to present
these

crucial

facts

uncovered
23

after

the

February

26,

1991

hearing.

Further discovery may have produced additional issues

of material
judgment.

fact which would have helped defeat the summary

For these reasons, the refusal of the trial court to

grant continuance of the Rule 56(f) Motion was arbitrary and
capricious and an abuse of the Court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
Bountiful has a mandatory statutory duty under §63-30-8
and §41-6-19 and a common law duty to provide streets free from
visually obstructing
motorists

of

Additionally,

the

foliage.
traffic

Bountiful

had

traffic control devices.

Bountiful had a duty to warn

hazard
a

duty

created
to

by

the

install

foliage.

and maintain

Whether Bountiful breached its duties

under the statutory or common law is a question of material fact
to be presented to a jury.

Summary judgment should not have been

awarded because there are genuine issues of material fact and the
defendant was not allowed to complete discovery which could have
brought to light additional issues of material fact.
The plaintiff respectfully requests that the Summary
Judgment Order be reversed and that the case be remanded for
trial on the merits with further instruction on the applicable
law to guide the trial court.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY C JONES, by and through
his guardian, RAYLENE P. JONES

:
:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

:
Civil No. 44129

BOUNTIFUL CITY CORPORATION, a
Municipal Corporation, and
John Does I through III
Defendant

:
:

Judge Douglas Cornaby

:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Defendant Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing before the above entitled Court on February 6,1991. The Plaintiff was represented
by Attorney Brian S. King, and the Defendant Bountiful City was represented by Layne B.
Forbes, City Attorney.
Having considered and reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, and Memorandums
of Points and Authorities on file, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds and
concludes:

FILMED
n m 9.229.

1.

The plaintiff was driving a motorcycle on Beverly Way at the

intersection of 1200 East in Bountiful, Utah and was injured in a collision with a motor
vehicle.
2.

The intersection was not controlled by any traffic control device.

3.

For purposes of the motion the Court will assume foliage from private

land to some degree obscured the plaintiffs vision of the intersection.
4.

The waiver of Section 63-30-8, U.C.A,, 1953, does not apply to the

failure to place traffic control devices at an intersection.

The facts of this case are

distinguished from cases in which a governmental unit has undertaken to control an
intersection by traffic control devices.
5.

The fact that the defendant failed to determine if a traffic control

device was warranted at this particular intersection was a discretionary function and bars
recovery.
6.

The defendant has no duty to remove foliage from private property,

even though the foliage may to some degree obscure visibility at the intersections.
7.

Section 63-30-8, U.C.A, 1953, refers to the failure of governmental

agencies to maintain streets and intersections. The foliage in this place was not growing on
the street or in the intersection, but was growing on private property.
8.

Additional discovery is not necessary for the court to rule on the duty

to remove foliage from private property.
9.

The court determines that there is no just reason for delay and,

0012333

pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby directs the
entry of final judgment as set forth below.
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
as follows:
Defendant Bountiful City's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted
and the complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the meritsDated this

zs~

day of April, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

DougiasTZbrnaby
District Judge
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LAYNE B. FORBES
RUSSELL L. MAHAN
Attorneys for Defendant
790 South 100 East
Bountiful, UT 84010

(#1098)
(#2059)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY C JONES, by and through
his guardian, RAYLENE P. JONES
Plaintiff,
vs.

BOUNTIFUL CITY CORPORATION, a
Municipal Corporation, and
John Does I through III

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Civil No. 44129
Judge Douglas Cornaby

Defendant

The plaintiff filed its Motion for Reconsideration on March 29,1991. Plaintiff
was represented by Brian S. King, and the defendant Bountiful City was represented by
Layne B. Forbes.
The court recognizes there is generally no such motion as a Motion for
Reconsideration. The court nevertheless has read all additional briefs submitted by the
parties.
The plaintiff requested oral arguments on the Motion for Reconsideration, and

at the same time submitted a Notice to Submit for Decision. The court heard oral argument
heretofore in defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment The plaintiff is not permitted oral
argument additionally, and is not entitled to reconsideration even though the court has given
reconsideration. Therefore, based on the foregoing and being fully advised in the premises:
It is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
Dated this

day of May, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

Douglas Cornaby
District Judge
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I graduated in 1966 from St. Louis University in

2

St. Louis, Missouri with a Bachelor's degree in psychology.

3

I graduated in 1974 with a Master's degree from Chapman

4

College in Orange, California.

5

Ph.d in educational psychology with a counseling psychology

6

emphasis from the University of Utah.

7

I graduated in 1986 with a

I have been employed since 1973 up until the

8

present in some capacity with psychological surphases. I

9

worked in California for five years as an instructor at a

10

community college.

11

college as a veteran's affairs psychometrist at Allan Hancock

12

Community College.

13

college as an instructor for five years and as a mental

14

health counselor.

15

Maria Joint Union High School District for one year.

16

worked for about two-and-a-half years for a psychologist in

17

California as his psychological assistant.

18

Utah I was employed from 1979 until 1988 by Davis County

19

Mental Health in Layton, Utah.

20

position at McKay-Dee Psych Resources, which at that point

21

was called the Behavioral Health Institute at McKay-Dee

22

Hospital.

23

Q

Great.

I also worked at the same community

I also worked at the same community

I was employed as a consultant at Santa
I

When we moved to

In 1988 I accepted my current

Thank you very much.

Were you involved in

24

an accident at the intersection of Beverly Way and 12th East

25

on September 6, 1985?

A

Yes.

u A i ilull

H

(Whereupon Exhibit No. 1 was
marked for identification.)
Q
incident.

Most of our deposition today will focus on that
Let me get into that by showing you a document

that we will have marked as Exhibit 1.

I've handed you

what's been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 1, Mrs. Bloss.
Take a moment to review that, and then let me ask you if you
can identify it.

Can you identify that document?

A

Yes.

Q

Does it bear your signature?

A

Yes.

Q

This is a statement that was given approximately

two to three weeks ago regarding the accident, and I would
like to go through it with you.

First of all, let me ask you

how familiar you were in 1985, at the time of the accident,
with this particular intersection?
A

We'd moved into our house in January of 1985, and

I probably drove through that intersection approximately once
a day from that point until the time of the accident and
since.
Q

Having reviewed this Exhibit 1 today, does it

accurately contain your recollections about what happened on
that day when you were involved in the accident?
A

Yes.

Associated Merit Reporters

EXHiBHA
Q

I won't go through the whole thing.

that's necessary.
questions.

I don't think

Let me ask a couple of follow-up

Do you recall how high the rose bushes were in

terms of inches or feet?
A

My recollection is that it would be about three

feet.
Q

Do you remember whether the rose bushes were in

bloom or at least had any kind of foliage on them?
A

They had foliage.

I don't recollect if they were

in bloom or not.
Q

They were leafed out?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall who the other person involved in the

accident was?
A

If I recall right, her name was Susan Hoskins.

Q

And could you tell me where in the intersection

you collided with Mrs. Hoskins or Mrs. Hoskins collided with
you?
A

My recollection is that we were both entering the

intersection, and I impacted her car.

I was told later that

I was further into the intersection than she was.
Q

And you were cited for failure to yield?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you specifically recall, as you approached the

intersection from the north, looking for traffic that may

Associated Merit Reporters

1

have been coming from the west, trying to see where the

2

traffic was coming from the west?

3

A

Specifically?

4

Q

Yes.

5

A

Not specifically.

6

right, look left, look right again and proceed.

7
8

My assumption is I always look

Q

Did you slow down as you approached the

intersection?

9

A

I'm sure I did.

10

Q

When was the first time you were able to see the

11
12

car that was coming from the west, that you recall?
A

I was already in the intersection, and I think I

13

must have checked for the second time to the right and then

14

saw it.

15
16

Q

It was at that point that the impact took place.
You indicate in Exhibit 1 that you contacted

certain individuals in Bountiful City.

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Before getting to that, though, let me ask you

19

this.

20

police officers?

21

Was this an accident that was investigated by any

A

I seem to recall that they took some information

22

at the scene, but I don't know what you mean by

23

"investigation".

24
25

Q

Do you recall that a police officer was called to

the scene of the accident?

L.A? H U M !••A

Yes.

Q

Was it a Bountiful City police officer?

A

Yes.

Q

Do you recall making any statements to the police

officer at the time of the accident about your concerns with
either the fact that the intersection was unmarked or the
rose bushes being a problem?
A

No.

Q

Do you recall the name of the officer who talked

with you?
A

No.

But I'm sure it's on some of the documents

that you have.
Q

Do you recall any conversation with Ms. Hoskins

about either the lack of signage at the intersection or the
rose bushes?
A

No.

Q

Did you talk with Ms. Hoskins at the scene of the

accident?
A

No.

Q

When was the first time you spoke with anyone

about the rose bushes at the intersection or the lack of
signage?
A

I know I spoke with my insurance agent about it

and wrote it in the report that I gave to my insurance
company, State Farm, the report for both myself and my

Associated Merit Renorfprq
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daughter.

I also mentioned the rose bushes in a document

that I submitted to the State of Utah, an accident report.
At some point I phoned Mr. Forbes here and asked him about
whether there was some way that I wouldn't be cited for
failure to yield right-of-way because of the intersection and
the rose bushes.

And my recollection of my conversation with

him is that he encouraged me to phone Mr. Balling, the city
engineer.
I then phoned Mr. Balling.

And, as I recall,

Mr. Balling said to me that a stop sign was placed in
intersections based upon two things, one was the frequency of
usage of the intersection and the second would be the
accident history of the intersection.

And that was basically

all I remember from the conversation.

I guess at the time I

assumed that this intersection didn't meet the criteria of
either of the two.
Q

Do you recall Mr. Balling telling you that he had

determined that the intersection didn't warrant a sign or
that, in the alternative, he would look into it?
A

I don't recall that specifically.

I remember

leaving the conversation with the thought that I had turned
in the information and then he could do with it as he chose
to do.
Q

Do you recall how long after the accident you

spoke with Mr. Forbes and Mr. Balling?

10
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1

A

I don't have a date on that.

I assume it was

2

within two weeks to a month after the accident, because I

3

wanted to kind of get everything over and done with.

4

Q

Did you speak with anyone else about the accident?

5

We've gone over the insurance company and the statement that

6

was submitted to the State of Utah, or document that was

7

submitted to the State of Utah, Mr. Balling and Mr. Forbes.

8

Anyone else that you can recall?

9

A

No.

10

Q

Did you ever talk with Ms. Hoskins about the

11
12

accident, call her after the fact ever?
A

No.

13

(Whereupon Exhibit No. 2 was

14

marked for identification.)

15

Q

Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit

16

No. 2, Mrs. Bloss.

Would you prefer me to call you Ms. Bloss

17

or Mrs. Bloss?

18

Mrs. Bloss.

19

A

You may call me Carol.

20

Q

That's probably the best.

Tell me if I'm offending you by calling you

I've shown you what's

21

been marked as Deposition Exhibit No. 2, Carol.

22

take a look at it, it's a multi-page document.

23

the record how many pages it is when I get a chance to put

24

mine in order.

25

and look through it, and then we can talk about it.

It's a nine-page document.

If you could
I '.11 say for

Take your time

11

A

These are incorrectly stapled, I believe.

Q

Have you noticed the fact that there's a Utah

driver's part in there with the Farmer's stuff; is that your
point?
A

This part here was something I submitted to the

State of Utah.
Q

Two pages?

A

Uh-huh.

Q

Let's pull that out.

A

I don't know where the back is.

Q

I think I have that right here.

separate that.

(Affirmative).

I was going to

Why don't we pull that out so we have this

down to be a seven-page document, all which relate to
statements you made to State Farm either in an interview or
forms you filled out.

So Exhibit No. 2 is now four pages

involving the recorded interview between you and Mr. West and
four pages of forms that were filled out and submitted to
State Farm, two pages of which involve injuries to you and
two pages of which involve injuries to your daughter, Julie;
is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Let's talk about this statement that was given to

Mr. West.
A

Have you reviewed this statement prior to today?
I've never seen this statement before.

I remember

giving it, but I've never seen it.

12
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Q

You've now had a chance to review it; is that

right?
A

Yes.

Q

Is it accurate, to your recollection?

Does it

accurately reflect, to your recollection, what you stated to
Mr. West?
A

Yes.

Q

And there is a reference on page three of that

statement to the fact that you told Mr. West, in November of
1985, that you felt that the rose bushes on the corner of
Brown's Park and Beverly Way interfered with or obstructed
the view you had of the other vehicle; is that correct?
A

Yes.

Q

Let's turn to page five of the exhibit, which is

the first page of the form that you've filled out.

Is it for

yourself or for Julie?
A

The one I have here says "Dorothy Carol Bloss", if

you drop down to about the middle of the page.
"Dorothy Carol Bloss."

Mine says

What does your say?

Q

I just want to make sure we're both looking at the

same page.

Let's talk about the application that you made to

State Farm.

Have you seen this application for benefits

before?
A

Yes.

Q

Did you keep a copy of it for your own records?

13
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A

Yes.

Q

And is this document that we've identified as

Exhibit 2 a true and accurate copy of the document that you
submitted to State Farm, your insurance company, for those
benefits?
A

Yes.

Q

I'll note, for the record, that there is a

reference in block five to the fact that at the time you
submitted this application for benefits you noted to State
Farm that the intersection was unmarked and the rose bushes
on the northwest corner of the intersection obstructed your
view.
A

Yes.

Q

Both you and your daughter, Julie, were injured in

this accident; is that correct?
A

We hit the windshield and went to the hospital and

were checked and released.
Q

Do you recall telling either Mr. Forbes or

Mr. Balling that you had been injured in the accident?
A

I don't recall.

Q

Do you recall that the police officer

investigating the accident knew that you had been injured?
A

The paramedics were called, and we were all

transported by the paramedics to Lake View.
Q

Do you recall whether Ms. Hoskins was injured?

14
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A

Her son, Lance, was injured.

I don't recall if

she or the other children were injured.
Q

Let's take a look at the last two pages of the

exhibit, which is the application for benefits that you
submitted to State Farm for your daughter, Julie.
ask you this.

And let me

Who filled out these applications for benefits

for yourself and for your daughter?
A

I did.

Q

And, once again, I note for the record that block

five of Julie's application also refers to the fact that the
intersection is unmarked and that there are rose bushes on
the northwest corner which obstructed your view.

Do you

recall any conversation that you had, at the time of the
accident or after, with your daughter about the rose bushes
obstructing your view or her view?
A

Not at that time.

We have since.

Q

And did Julie, likewise, feel that the rose bushes

obstructed the view of the other vehicle?
A

And that it's a dangerous intersection.

Q

Yes to both?

A

Yes.
(Whereupon Exhibit No. 3 was
marked for identification.)

Q

I've handed you what's been marked as Deposition

Exhibit No. 3, Carol.

If you could take a look at it and

15
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is that correct?
A

Would you repeat the question?

Q

Is it true that, had you observed, you could have

seen Vehicle 2 further down the road and earlier than at the
time of the accident?
A

I'm saying that, because of the rose bushes, I

feel that if Vehicle 2 were in a certain area, a certain
window, so to speak, that the rose bushes obliterate the
view.

And then I'm right-handed, and I tend to look right

and then look left and then look right again before I make
moves with my car.

And so I think what happened is, the rose

bushes obliterated my view in this vicinity.

This is also a

hill, and the rose bushes obstructed my view in this area
here.

I checked here, and by the time I checked the second

time the car was closer.
Q

You say you normally look right, left and then

right.
A

Right.

Q

Do you have an independent recollection that

that's what you did on this day?
A

No.

I don't have an independent recollection.

Q

Back to the question.

I don't know what the

distances are, but I'm pointing to -A

My car.

Q

-- your car, and even a little north of the rear

30
Associated

MPrit- Ror^n-r-f-a-r-G

4

i

turned and saw the glance of it.
MR. FORBES:

So

—

I believe that's all.
EXAMINATION

BY MR. DALBY;
Q

Cindy, what's your current address?

A

5454 South 3350 West.

Q

I want to direct your attention to Exhibit 1

again, just a couple of questions.

I assume you've been back

to the accident scene a couple of times since the accident;
is that right?
A

Yes.

Q

As you've drawn Stan's motorcycle and Mr. Wright's

vehicle, just prior to the collision, if you were to go back
to the same spot that you've drawn the motorcycle, would you
have an unobstructed view of 1200 East?

In other words, is

there anything to obstruct your vision of this incoming
street where you've drawn the motorcycle?
A

When I went back to it I looked at it and yes,

there's some bushes or rose bushes or something right here.
And

™
Q

Why don't you just draw, put some "R's" where the

the bushes are?
A

Seems like they're —

this way, too.
Q

I can't remember if they go

I put it there and they go this way.

How high would you say those bushes are?

Best
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1I guess is fine.
2

A

I don't know.

About as tall as I am.

3

they were really tall ones.

4

ones.

5

six feet.

6
7
8
9
10

About

—

They weren't just little, short

They were really tall and it's probably about five to

Q

I don't know.
And these were bushes.

Were there any trees or

anything else to block your vision?
A

They might have had trees up this way, but I just

remember the rose bushes.
Q

When you were talking about your conversation with

11

Mr. Wright, when Stan went to see him afterwards, the last

12

thing you said, I believe, and correct me if I'm wrong, Mr.

13

Wright said he couldn't see you.

Is that what you said?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

Jo you remember Mr. Wright saying that?

16

A

It might have been his mom telling me that.

17

just heard that —

18

if it was actually him or his mom that told me that because I

19

talked to his mom quite often and it could be that she told

20

me, "He couldn't see you.11

21

Q

it might have been his mom.

I

I don't know.

Let me get my directions right.

I don't know

I don't remember.
As you were

22

proceeding eastbound on Beverly Way was there any yield sign

23

or stop sign in your lane of travel?

24

A

No.

25 J

Q

When you went back to the accident scene did you
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1

within a couple weeks after that

2

Q.

3

A.

4

Q.

—

Okay.
of the accident that I had*
This purports to document an accident that

5

occurred at the intersection of Beverly Way and 1200 East

6

on August 14, 1987.

7

were involved in?

8

A.

Yes, it is.

9

Q.

Okay.

10

Is that an accident that you in fact

You are the individual that's identified

here as the Kevin P. O'Connell

—

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

-- driving one of the vehicles?

13

about the accident.

Can you tell me

I know the report speaks for itself.

14

A.

Right.

15

Q.

But why don't you tell me what happened.

16

A.

I was driving southbound on 1200 East and came

17

upon the intersection with Beverly, and I started through

18

the intersection, basically was almost all the way through

19

it, and a gentleman came eastbound on Beverly Way and hit

20

the rear quarter, the very back portion of my car.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

And he hit it hard enough it just basically

23
24
25

turned the car around.
Q.

Okay.

Do you have any specific recollections

about the condition of the intersection on this day of the

1

accident?

2

A.

It's always been an intersection with poor

3

visibility.

4

is obstructed with rosebushes on one side plus it's an open

5

intersection, no yield sign no stop sign, nothing*

6

just wide open.

7

Q.

You can't see very well through it.

Your view

It's

Have you had a chance to go through that

8

intersection -- let me rephrase that.

9

accident, which I understand occurred approximately a year

10

Prior to this

after you had moved into the neighborhood --

11

A.

Right.

12

Q.

-- had you had an opportunity to use the

13

intersection before?

14

A.

Oh, numerous times.

15

Q.

You were aware of its condition?

16

A.

Yeah.

Like I say, there is a lot of

17

intersections right through there that are basically the

18

same way they are not marked or anything.

19

Q.

Okay.

20

A.

That's one of the ways I go home.

21

There is two

different routes I go home, and that's one of the ways I do

22

I

go home from time to time.

23

|

24

|

date of this accident, that you tried to see whether there

25

|

was traffic coming eastbound on Beverly Way?

Q.

Do you remember specifically recalling, on the

1

A.

Yes, I did.

2

Q.

And could you see any traffic coming?

3

A.

No.

I approached the intersection, and you can

at one point, you can look down the hill to see if

4

look —

5

anything is out there, and then as soon as you go past that

6

point, the house —

7

house, and then you have a small space, and then you see

8

the rosebushes.

9

kind of tough to see.

10

Q,

Okay.

'til you come along and you see the

So, unless you look right in there, that's

Can you describe for me how the rosebushes

11

appeared to you back on the date of this accident, I mean

12

how high they were, whether they were in bloom or not, that

13

type of thing?

14

A.

Yeah.

It was August, so they were in bloom, I

15

mean, the green leaves and everything were on them, yeah.

16

I don't know how many roses were on them, per se, but they

17

were in bloom, you know, for that time of year.

18

Q.

Do you recall how high they were?

19

A.

I can't say exactly.

20
21
22
23

I would guess four to five

feet high, somewhere in that range.
Q.

Okay.

Are you aware of any other accidents that

have occurred at that intersection?
A.

When we were involved in the accident, quite a

24

few of the neighbors came out, and pretty much every one of

25

them told me there had been probably five or six accidents

1

in the last two years at that intersection.

They said, you

2

know, it's been a problem, and, you know, they felt it was

3

a bad intersection.

4

Q.

Okay.

Did the police investigate the accident?

5

A.

When the police came, I had left the car in the

6

road, you know, I didn't move my car.

And the officer came

7

up, and he said, would you please move your car off to

8

here.

9

1200 East.

He had me pull it over on to Beverly, just above

10

And I said, well, don't you want to see what

11

happened as far as determining who is at fault with the

12

accident?

13
14
15
16

And he says, no, I have what I need.
know, pull your car over.
Q.

Okay.

Please, you

So, I did.

Did you say any —

do you remember who

that officer was?

17

A.

Carl -- I think it was Crawl, Carl or Crawl.

18

Q.

Was there any -- did you say anything to the

19

officer about either the rosebushes or the yield or stop

20

sign or any other problems with the intersection?

21

A.

Well, I talked with him a little bit, because

22

after we got into the car and started filling out the

23

report, he starts writing me a ticket.

24

shouldn't be the one cited in the accident.

25

And I felt that I

And he said, yes, you failed to yield to the

'VUiCITf
1

right and you are going to be cited.

2

explain to him that I was basically through the

3

intersection, and I felt the other party was at fault.

4

And I tried to

And he says, no, Utah law says you didn't yield

5

to the right, you are responsible.

6

ticket and, you know, we finished filling out the report, I

7

said, you know, some of the neighbors have told me about

8

accidents happening here, and I feel it's not a very good

9

intersection.

10

And after he gave me my

And I asked him what he thought should be done,

11

and at that time he answered he thought some kind of a

12

yield sign or something should be put up there.

13

basically agreed with me, it wasn't a very good

14

intersection, you know, because I told him then, I believe,

15

that the, you know, rosebushes obstructed your view, and

16

there is no kind of sign at all there.

And he

17

Q.

Okay.

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Do you believe the accident would have occurred

20
21

And that was at the scene of the accident?

if the rosebushes hadn't been there?
A.

I feel I would have had a lot better chance to

22

see someone, because it's right there as you drive and

23

approach it in your field of vision.

24

right to see, and you are basically in the intersection

25

before you can see again as to anyone coming up the road.

You look off to the

1
2

Q.

Okay.

Now, you mentioned that you were cited fo

failure to yield?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Did you eventually end up making a court

5

appearance on that?

6

A.

Yes, I did.

7

Q.

Tell me about that.

8

A.

Well, originally, I went down before the court

9

What happened at that time?

appearance and complained to the police department that I

10

felt, you know, the officer was totally wrong in giving me

11

a ticket to start with.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

A.

I believe it was a Sgt. Winters or Winter.

14

do you recall who you talked to?

can't remember his exact name.

15

Q.

Do you recall when that was?

16

A.

It was within a week to two weeks of the

17
18
19

I

accident, a week or ten days, because I had my ticket, and
I would have to pay it.
Q.

Let me -- that is brings us to this exhibit.

I

20

have handed you, Mr. O'Connell, what's been marked as

21

Deposition Exhibit No. 2, which consists of your

22

exhibit -- consists of two original pages, one being a

23

yellow copy of a ticket that it appears was written to you

24

on the date of the accident, and the other being a

25

receipt.

1

Does this help place, in your mind, the

2

conversation that you had with the other individual at the

3

police department?

4

(Whereupon Exhibit No. 2 was

5

identified in the record.)

6

A.

Yeah.

I know I went down and paid this during

7

the day, of course on the 28th, and I can't remember if it

8

was that day or the next day.

9

that same week I went back, because the officer that I had

10

to talk to, the sergeant that I had to talk to was a night

11

sergeant, and he was not on during the day.

12

back down late one afternoon and talked to him when the

13

shift changed.

14

Q.

I see.

It would have been during

And I went

Now, there is -- on your original, there

15

is a little handwritten note on the top of the ticket,

16

which says Sgt. Winter.

17

A*

Yes.

Is that your writing?

That's my writing, because I was calling

18

him when I had the ticket, finding out who I would have to

19

talk with.

20

Q.

I see.

21

A.

Because it really upset me, you know, from the

22

first day, that I even had a ticket, so --

23
24

25

Q.

And what did Sgt. Winters say when you talked to

A.

He basically told me the same thing Officer Crawl

hira?

12
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1

had told me, that I had failed to yield to the right, and

2

there was nothing anyone could do, you know, and I had

3

already decided before that to go to court anyway, so I

4

just figured I would wait and go to court.

5
6

Q.

Okay.

Did you specifically talk with Sgt. Winter

about the rosebushes?

7

A.

Yes.

I told him basically the same thing I told

8

the officer, I felt it was a bad intersection and something

9

really should be done about it.

And, you know, he listened

10

to what I had to say but really didn't offer much after

11

that as to if something would be done or not.

12
13

Q.

Okay.

After the time you spoke with Sgt. Winter,

did you eventually make an appearance on your ticket?

14

A.

Yes, I did.

15

Q.

Okay, when was that?

16

A.

It was probably a month or two after that,

Do you recall?

17

because I know they didn't give me a court date right

18

away.

19

exact date of the court appearance.

20
21
22

I can't remember it, to be honest with you, the

Q.

Do you have any records that would help you with

A.

The only thing I could -- I really don't have

that?

23

anything.

I really don't.

I know it was probably in

24

October, if I remember correctly.

25

the latest.

October, or November at
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1

Q.

What happened at that time?

2

A.

The judge heard my testimony and the officer*s

3

test imony, and we both drew pictures on the blackboard and

4

what not, and the judge said just going by the police

5

officer* s drawing, that I never should have been cited, and

6

they found me not guilty and refunded my money and, you

7

know , I had to wait to get a check back from Bountiful

8

City , so I am sure there is something there as to when the

9

cour t date was.

10

Q.

11

been cit ed?

12

A.

Did the court indicate why you shouldn't have

He felt, just by looking at the drawing, that I

13

had cleared most of the intersection, where he said if I

14

had just started into the intersection and hit the other

15

car on the, you know, the side of their car, I would have

16

been guilty of failing to yield; but when I was clear

17

exce pt f or the very rear of the car, he felt that the

18

officer had, you know, cited me wrong.

19
20
21

Q.

Okay,

Did you say anything to the judge about

the rose bushes or the dangerous nature of the intersection?

A.

No,

They gave me a chance to ask questions of

22

the officer there, and I basically only asked one

23

ques tion

24

acci dent s there, and he told me, no, not that he knew of.

25

I just asked him if there had been a lot of

And I just figured, well, at that point,

1

whatever he told me, he wasn't going to say there, and it

2

would have been pointless.

3

that I had to the city, to the city attorney or the judge,

4

and no one wanted to see my pictures.

5

it.

6
7

Q.

I did offer to show my pictures

That was pre tty much

Do you recall who was there from the City

Attorney ; s Department?

8

A*

I think it was Layne Mecham.

9

Q.

You have met Mr. Forbes here.

10
11

Was it Mr. Forbes

that you recall?
A.

When I hear his name, it sounds like he was the
There was a Layne there, and f or some

12

one that was there.

13

reason I had it at as Mr. Mecham.

14

I am not sure.

Q.

I had it as Mech am

Do you recall saying anything to the Boun tiful

15

City Att Drney's Office about the rosebushes or the

16

intersec tion itself?

17

A.

I don't.

18

Q.

You mentioned some pictures that you had taken?

19

A.

Uh-huh.

20

Q.

Let me show you -- let me just ask this.

Let me

21

give you , Mr. O'Connell, the packet a number of pictures,

22

if you could count them and identify them for us.

23

whether you recognize them, first.

24
25

A.

Yes.

Tell me

This is 20 pictures, and these are pictures

that I d id take of the accident scene and of my car within,

RONALD E. DALBY (0807)
MATTHEW J. STOREY (4678)
BRIAN S. KING (4610)
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4516 South 700 East, Suite 280
P.O. Box 17345
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 261-0088
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STANLEY C. JONES, by and through
his guardian, RAYLENE P. JONES#

]
i
I
1

Plaintiff,

M O T I O N
T O
C O N T I N U E

vs.
BOUNTIFUL CITY CORP., a Municipal
Corporation, and John Does I
through III,

i

Civil No. 44129

i

Judge Douglas Cornaby

Defendants.
The Plaintiff, through his undersigned counsel, moves
for continuance of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to 'Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
This Motion is based on the fact that prior to the
receipt

by

Judgment,
Production

the

Plaintiff

Plaintiff
of

sent

Documents

of
to
and

Defendant's Motion
the

for Summary

Defendant his Requests for

Notice

of

Depositions

of

key

individuals within the Bountiful City Corporation with knowledge
concerning duties undertaken by Bountiful City to regulate the
growth of foliage on Rowena Beaver's property.

The degree to

which Bountiful City had notice of the obstruction of vision
presented by the foliage is presently unknown.

Whether Bountiful

City undertook a duty to enforce a certain height for the foliage

U A ? HU1 J iJ
and the scope of that duty is also unknown. The outstanding
discovery seeks to uncover facts showing that Bountiful City had
notice that foliage growing on private property obstructed the
vision of drivers using the intersection of Beverly Way and 1200
East

and/or

that

Bountiful

City

undertook

responsibility

to

inform the private property owner of the hazard and enforce
notices provided to the private property owner regulating the
height of the foliage.
The responses to the outstanding discovery directly
affect the issues raised by Bountiful in its Motion for Summary
Judgment*

The

present

lack

of

information

sought

in

the

discovery requests precludes, to some extent, presentation by the
Plaintiff of affidavit facts essential to justify opposition to
the Motion.

As such, under Rule 56(f) proper consideration of

the issues raised by Bountiful City in its Motion for Summary
Judgment should be continued until these key facts are known.
DATED THIS _££ DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1991.
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES

BRIAN S. KING
Attorney for Plaintiff

2

EXHIBIT e _
Goicoechea
Law Offices
SALT L A K E CITY

RONALD E. DALBY
MATTHEW J. STOREY

A Partnership with Professional Corporation

4516 South 700 East,
Suite 280
The Aspenwood
P.O. Box 17345
Salt Lake City, UT 841177345
Salt Lake City
(801)261-0088

March 19, 1991

FAX*
[801] 269-9987
Toll Free Outside Area
Nationwide
1-800-999-LAW4

Honorable Judge Douglas Cornaby
100 North 650 West
Farmington, Utah 84025

Office Locations
COLORADO
Oenver
IDAHO
Boise
Burley
Coeur d Alene
Idaho Falls
Lewtston
Nampa
Pocateilo
Twin Falls
UTAH
Ogden
Provo
Salt Lake City
West Valley
WASHINGTON
Spokane

Re:

Jones v. Bountiful City Corp.
Civil No. 44129

Dear Judge Cornaby:
On February 26, 1991, at the conclusion of the hearing
on Bountifulfs Motion for Summary Judgment and Stan
Jones' Motion for Continuance in the above referenced
case, you took under advisement consideration of the
Motions and indicated that you would await filing by
Jones of a Supplemental Memorandum if and when facts
came to light prior to the discovery cutoff that shed
light on the issues raised in Bountiful1s Motion and
the Memorandum we submitted in opposition thereto.
Discovery has proceeded by both parties since the
hearing and there is significant outstanding discovery
to be responded to. By this letter, I want to inform
the Court and opposing counsel that we do plan on
submitting a Supplemental Memorandum of Facts and Law
that I believe will clearly establish that Bountiful1s
Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
My purpose in writing this letter is, first, to confirm
that no ruling on Bountiful*s Motion will issue until
supplemental information is provided by the parties
and, second, to propose a time frame for submitting
that additional material. The discovery cutoff in the
case is scheduled for Monday, April 22. I propose that
any materials we will be submitting be due on Monday,
the 29th and the reply from Bountiful City be due
Monday, May 6.

lORPORATE OFFICES
Boise Idaho

EXHIBIT
JUDGE DOUGLAS CORNABY
March 19, 1991
Page two

RE: JONES V. BOUNTIFUL CITY

I appreciate your consideration of this issue.
Sincerely,
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES

Brian ^. King
BSK/jh
cc:

Layne Forbes

